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Abstract
The present paper provides first microlevel (indirect) empirical evidence on changes
in the determinants of firm profitability, the role of fixed and sunk costs, as well as the
nature of competition for a transition economy. We estimate size thresholds required
to support different numbers of firms for four retail and professional service industries
in a large number of geographic markets in Slovakia. The three time periods in the
analysis (1995, 2001 and 2010) characterize different stages of the transition process.
Specific emphasis is given to spatial spill-over effects between local markets. Estimation
results obtained from a spatial ordered probit model suggest that entry barriers have
declined considerably (except for restaurants) and the intensity of competition has
increased. We further find that demand spill-overs and/or the effects associated with
a positive correlation in unobservable explanatory variables seem to outweigh negative
spill-over effects caused by competitive forces between neighboring cities and villages.
The importance of these spatial spill-over effects differs across industries.
Keywords: entry thresholds, competition, Slovakia, transition, geographic markets
JEL codes: L22, D22, M13, R11
∗This paper is part of the research project “OP Vzdela´vanie (OP Education): Increasing the quality of
doctoral studies and support of the international research” at the FNE, University of Economics in Bratislava
(ITMS 26140230005). The project was co-financed by the European Union. We thank Stefan Rehak and
seminar participants at WIFO, ifo Dresden, REDETE and the Vienna University of Economics and Business
for their valuable contributions to and comments on this paper. We also thank INFOSTAT (affiliation of
the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic) for providing data and Stefan Wilhelm for his contribution to
the codes used in this paper. The article was generously supported by the Austrian National Bank (OeNB)
Anniversary Fund (Project-Number: 16016).
†University of Economics in Bratislava, Vienna University of Economics and Business
‡University of Economics in Bratislava
§Vienna University of Economics and Business
1
1 Introduction and Literature Review
Entry of new firms and exit of others is an essential element of competition in a market econ-
omy. Investigating this issue in transition economies is especially interesting since “transition
economies make a particularly good laboratory for understanding the dynamics of market
evolution” (Estrin (2002), p.101). By studying the relationship between market structure
(entry, exit and the number of firms in a market) and market size (population) for differ-
ent regional markets, economists can gain insight into the determinants of firm profitability,
the role of fixed and sunk costs, as well as the nature of competition. If competition is
increasing in the number of firms, market size has to increase disproportionately to support
additional firms.1 Estimating entry thresholds from the relationship between the number of
firms and an exogenous profit shifter (such as population) provides evidence on the toughness
of competition (defined as the rate at which the post-entry equilibrium markup falls with
the addition of competitors) for a product or industry. The attractiveness of this approach
rests in the fact that it can be applied with modest data requirements. The relative degree of
competition can be assessed on the basis of information on the number of firms, population
size and other market demographics for a cross-section of local markets.
This entry threshold approach, pioneered by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Bresnahan
and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992), has been modified and extended in a number of ways.
The effects of product differentiation are investigated in Mazzeo (2002), Davis (2006), and
Schaumans and Verboven (2015). Mazzeo (2002) and Davis (2006) use direct measures of
oligopolists’ product characteristics and prices to measure the effects of product differenti-
ation on competition and markups in local motel (Mazzeo) and cinema (Davis) markets.
Product differentiation substantially lessens competition in these industries. Effects of prod-
uct differentiation and firm heterogeneity are investigated in Schaumans and Verboven (2015)
for different local service sectors in Belgium. The authors argue that entry typically leads to
1For example, if the smallest market size necessary to support one firm is equal to S (“monopoly entry
threshold”) then the market size (the number of inhabitants) must be greater than 2S to support two firms
if competition reduces per-capita profits.
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a market expansion effect which implies that traditional entry thresholds may underestimate
the competition effects from entry. Related work by Berry and Waldfogel (2010) focuses on
vertical product differentiation and investigates whether larger markets offer better prod-
ucts. In the case of restaurants, they find that the number of high-quality products increases
in market size; for newspapers the authors argue that average product quality increases as
markets grow without an increase in variety. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) consider
differences in firm size (in addition to differences in the number of firms). They find that
establishments are larger in larger cities, ceteris paribus. Carree and Dejardin (2007) differ-
entiate explicitly between entry and exit of firms. The importance of imperfect information
is investigated in Grieco (2014) who examines the effects of supercenters on rural grocery
markets. Based upon the work of Abbring and Campbell (2010), Collard-Wexler (2014) es-
timates dynamic ordered probit models which allow the author to compute entry and exit
thresholds separately. Using data for the ready-mix concrete market, the author investigates
the evolution of market structure following an exogenous shock (a merger to monopoly) in a
local market. The author’s finding, that it takes between nine and ten years for a new firm
to enter the market following the merger, suggests that the dynamics of market evolution
can be quite low in sectors with significant entry barriers; data for a long time horizon are
required to observe changes in market structure and firm conduct empirically.
The present paper extends the entry threshold approach in two dimensions: (a) we provide
first empirical evidence on (changes of) market conduct and competition in a transition
economy and (b) we devote specific attention to potential spill-over effects between regional
markets and the spatial dimension of competition.
While the existing empirical literature exclusively focuses on market structure and com-
petition in developed market economies, similar microlevel studies for transition economies
are lacking.2 The structure of a planned economy as well as the behavior of firms (or produc-
2Only a small number of empirical studies are devoted to analyzing entry and exit in transition economies
so far. Roberts and Thompson (2003) estimate entry and exit rates across 152 3-digit industries in Poland.
Similarly, Bojnec and Xavier (2004) investigate the determinants of firm entry and exit for a cross section of
3-digit industries in the Slovenian manufacturing sector. The present paper follows a different approach by
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tion units) in this environment differs from the structure and conduct of firms in a market
economy in many dimensions. During the communist regime, firms were not independent
decision-making units and were not responsible for sales or pricing. Competitive rivalry was
weak or nonexistent and entry of new firms as well as bankruptcy and exit of existing ones was
effectively impossible (Estrin (2002)). Compared to market economies, firms were very large
and market structure highly concentrated. With the collapse of communism, these countries
experienced a fundamental change in their economic and institutional environment. State-
owned enterprises were broken up and privatized and a large number of new (mostly small)
firms were founded. This process of entry of new firms and the re-structuring of existing ones
was instrumental in creating a market structure which is conducive to competition between
independent rivals. Given the very specific structure of a centrally planned economy as well
as the significant economic and institutional changes during the process of transition, an
empirical analysis for individual industries can provide novel insights into the evolution of
market structure and firm conduct in a transition economy.
An explicit consideration of the spatial dimension of competition constitutes the second
novel contribution of the present empirical analysis. For many product markets, consumers
face transportation (time) costs when switching between different suppliers. The entry-
threshold approach assumes that transportation costs between different regional submarkets
are prohibitively high so that individual markets are fully isolated. The equilibrium in one
market must be independent – in terms of demand and competition – of other markets. While
this might be a plausible assumption in some sparsely populated (rural) regions,3 the high
focusing on industry dynamics within individual industries. Avdasheva et al. (2007) summarize the broader
Industrial Organization literature on competition in transition economies with a specific focus on empirical
studies for Russia.
3Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), for example, identify towns or small cities in the continental United States
that are at least 20 miles from the nearest town of 1,000 people or more to estimate their econometric
models. Similar procedures for identifying isolated markets are used in Collard-Wexler (2014), who uses a
20 mile threshold and merges towns which are very close to each other (so-called “twins”). Zang and Scott
(2016) use a comparable approach to identify isolated markets for medical services, whereby they exclude all
metropolitan service areas which are with-in 50 miles of another MSA, all small counties (with population
below 50 000) and all counties which are less than 15 miles from another large county or less than 50 miles
from an MSA. However, using a distance-based exclusion policy is not feasible in more densely populated
markets, which has lead some authors to focus on size rather than isolation. To mitigate problems with
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population density in many European countries raises doubts concerning the assumption of
perfectly isolated regional markets. Although the “isolated markets” approach has generated
a number of important applications, the extrapolation of the estimation results obtained
from a sample of rural markets to urban areas is not possible. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki
(2015) conclude: “Focusing on rural areas makes the approach impractical for many interest-
ing retail industries that are predominantly urban” (p. 26). The importance of demand and
competition spill-over effects between regions will not be identical over time and/or for all
occupations: the process of transition was accompanied by significant investments in infras-
tructure as well as an increased mobility of consumers (due to an increase in income),4 which
should have strengthened the spill-over effects between individual regions for some industries.
In the present analysis, we aim at extending the concept of “entry thresholds” to a spatial
context. We apply this approach to four professional service industries in a large number
of geographic markets in Slovakia. The results from the estimation of a spatial ordered-
probit model for three years (1995, 2001, and 2010) provide evidence on the transformation
of market structure and firm conduct during different stages of transition from a centrally
planned towards a market economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly highlights relevant changes in the
economic environment in Slovakia during the transition period. Section 3 presents the econo-
metric specification. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 summarizes and
proposes possible extensions.
overlapping markets in European countries, Carree and Dejardin (2007) use data for nonurban areas (all 455
Belgian municipalities whose local population is less than 20,000 inhabitants). Similarly, Schaumans and
Verboven (2008) and Schaumans and Verboven (2015) retain only local markets with a population density
below 800 inhabitants per square kilometer and a market size below 15,000 inhabitants.
4Note that investment in road infrastructure in 2001 (2010) was 2.79 (5.45) times higher than in 1995
(OECD (2013b)). The beginning of transformation process was characterized by low capital and labor
mobility at intra- and inter- regional level (Morvay (2005)). The number of vehicles in Slovakia increased
from 1.65 million in 1995 to 2.34 million in 2010. Besides, the number of passenger cars increased from 1.09
million in 2003 to 1.67 million in 2010 (MISR (2014)). The length of motorways increased by 60 % during
1995-2004 period (from 198 to 316 km) (EC (2006)) and reached 384 km in 2008 (EURF (2011)).
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2 Transition in Slovakia and Market Description
Slovakia, a small open economy, started its transition as a part of the Czechoslovak Feder-
ation. As all countries in transition, Czechoslovakia experienced a deep transition recession
in the early 1990s, during which output dropped significantly. The Slovak economy was hit
much harder than its Czech counterpart (output dropped by more than 20% and unemploy-
ment rates exceeded 10%), as its industrialization during the communist period made it more
dependent on markets in the Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern European satellites
(Beblavy´ (2010)). However, Slovakia recovered quickly from the initial output collapse. Fol-
lowing its peaceful “Velvet Divorce” Slovakia gained independence from Czechoslovakia on
1 January 1993. Economic reforms slowed in 1994-98 but then regained momentum under a
reform-oriented coalition government which restructured enterprises and banks and initiated
large-scale privatizations of state-owned enterprises. These economic changes paved the way
for Slovakia to enter the European Union in May 2004 and to adopt the euro currency at
the beginning of 2009. The increasing pressure from foreign competitors may have had an
additional impact on structural change and firm performance; the Slovak economy today is
among the most dynamic of the Central and Eastern European countries (OECD (2013a)).
The mid 1990s characterize the early phase of transition. Some first reforms to establish
more efficient markets were already introduced at this time; the liberalization of prices and
foreign trade started in 1991. 1995 was the third year of an independent Slovak economy and
the second year of growth after the transition depression. The economic environment was
strongly influenced by a search for a specific “Slovak way” of transition (Marcincˇin (2002)).
Policy makers refused to continue with the harsh reforms initiated when Slovakia was still
part of the Czechoslovak Federation (1990-1992). The so-called “Slovak way” of transition
was characterized by a slowdown of reform measures, mistrust towards foreign investors,
opaque privatization measures (as exemplified by “sale to pre-selected owners” procedures),
exertion of political influence on investment flows and a revival of state paternalism and
interventionism. In this period, the ownership structure of enterprises was highly fragmented
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(an outcome of mass privatization) and foreign strategic investors were absent. This period
ended with the parliamentary elections held at the end of 1998 when a new government was
formed.
The early 2000s was a period during which many corrections of the early transformation
process were implemented. Macroeconomic stabilization was achieved and the economy was
gradually directed towards EU integration. The new government focused on strengthening
competitiveness and initiated the transformation process in sectors that had been protected
during the previous regime (Morvay (2005)). More specifically, the following measures were
implemented: the banking sector was restructured which eased financial flows and at the same
time weakened political influence on the allocation of credit; institutions and procedures of
regulatory interventions were changed (regulatory bodies independent from direct political
influence were established); privatization mostly took place via international tenders; and
the economy opened more significantly to foreign investors, which lead to increased foreign
investment inflows.
In the third stage of the transformation process, the Slovak economy is well integrated
into the EU (since becoming a member in 2004) and in many important dimensions com-
pares well to Western European economies. After the 2009 economic recession, the economy
in 2010 was growing rapidly again (OECD (2012)). Economic growth in this period was
distinctively mono-structural (dependent on strong expansion in a small number of branches
in the manufacturing industry, especially in the manufacture of passenger vehicles). Growth
in these sectors was ensured by the reorientation of export, while domestic demand remained
weak. The entry in the EU suggests that the economy has already reached a certain level
of commensurability with the economic environment in the more developed economies of the
EU even if income levels are still lagging behind significantly (Bartosva´ and Zˇelinsky´ (2013)).
After the transformation recession, gross income, measured by gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita, increased rapidly, especially in the second half of the transition period. While
GDP per capita was less then 48 % of EU-27 in 1995, it reached 52 % in 2001 and grew to
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more than 72 % in 2010 (Beblavy´ (2010), Sikulova (2014)).
While the macroeconomic process of transition has been well documented (Beblavy´ (2010)),
there is limited information regarding the microeconomic forces behind this process. Me-
likhova et al. (2013) point to service industries as an important driver of economic growth.
The present empirical analysis aims at investigating changes in entry behavior and competi-
tive conduct in four service industries during the transition period.
3 Data and Empirical Framework
3.1 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The empirical analysis is conducted for four occupations (automobile dealers, electricians,
plumbers and restaurants) in 2800 to 2900 regional submarkets in Slovakia for three time
periods (1995, 2001, and 2010). The occupations chosen are dominated by small and inde-
pendent sellers and are similar to those analyzed in previous empirical studies.
The number of firms in each occupation is obtained from the “Register of Economic
Subjects” of the Slovak Republic which covers the whole population of firms in manufacturing
and services. Information is collected on the location and main economic activity (classified
according to the NACE Rev. 1 classification of industries) of each firm. From this we
compute the number of sellers in the different local markets. Following previous research,
markets are defined at the level of ZIP codes which roughly corresponds to the definition of a
city or village in Slovakia. The number of cities and villages (regional submarkets) identified
in this way in 1995 (2001 and 2010) is 2843 (2858 and 2926).5 Data on population as well
5The main results in this paper are based on the full sample of towns from “Urban and Municipal
Statistics”. The larger cities (such as Bratislava and Kosice) are divided into a number of submarkets.
Unfortunately, the exact location of each individual firm within the market is not available. Our empirical
model thus follows previous research and assumes that the location of a firm within a market does not have any
implications on its profits or on the degree of competition with other firms. The different number of regional
submarkets identified for the three time periods is due to the “de-integration” of several municipalities into
separate units over time. The village Zˇitavany, for instance, was established in 2002 by splitting the town
Zlate´ Moravce into two separate units. A detailed description of these changes can be found in MISR (2013)
and SOSR (2014).
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as demographic characteristics of the regional markets are obtained from the “Urban and
Municipal Statistics”. The population of cities and villages is highly skewed, ranging from
12 to 111800, with an average of 1879 in 2010 (at the end of our observation period).
We control for several market characteristics such as wages, unemployment rates and the
share of young and senior population. Data on wages and unemployment rates are taken
from the “Regional Statistics Database”. Unfortunately, we only observe these variables at
the district level (for 79 districts). The share of population aged below 15 years and above 60
years for each market is obtained from the “Urban and Municipal Statistics”. We supplement
the dataset with information on the distances between cities and villages in order to capture
the spatial distribution of occupations. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in
the Appendix.
Tables 1 shows the number of regional markets with a given number of firms. Following
previous research, we pool all markets with more than seven firms into one category since
the number of observations for larger market sizes is insufficient to accurately identify entry
effects for 8 or more competitors.
Note that the distribution of firm numbers differs substantially between periods, as well
as between occupations. While the clear majority of villages and cities in 1995 did not
have a single automobile dealer (nor an electrician or plumber), by 2010 there is at least
one incumbent firm in about 50% of all regional markets. This trend is broken only by the
restaurant industry. The sector had the broadest market coverage in 1995 when there were
only 39 % of markets without a restaurant. Since then, market coverage slightly decreased;
in 2001 (2010), 42 % (43 %) of local markets had no restaurant.
To illustrate changes in market structure over time, Table 2 shows the transition prob-
abilities of the number of firms over the time period (1995 to 2010). All four markets are
fairly dynamic. The transition probabilities for automobile dealers show, for instance, that
a duopoly market in 1995 has a 12 % probability of being a monopoly market, an 11 %
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Figure 1: Cluster analysis of the number of electricians in 2010 based on Getis-Ord statistics
Cold spot − 5% Significance
Insignificant G−statistic
Hot spot − 5% Significance
Note: The size of each observation is determined by the population quantile in which it falls. Towns with a
high population have been enlarged.
probability of having no supplier, and a 54 % probability of having two or more firms 15
years later.
The large share of local markets with no incumbent highlights the importance of explicitly
accounting for spatial spill-over effects as inhabitants from these markets are forced to employ
the services of firms from neighboring administrative units. The existence of these markets
will thus contribute positively to the profitability of firms located in the neighborhood.
The importance of the spatial dimension in investigating market structure is further
emphasized by the strong clustering of economic activities in space. Figure 1 shows the
results of a Getis-Ord analysis in the market for electricians in Slovakia in 2010.6 Urban
areas appear to attract firms in neighboring administrative units, with small villages in the
vicinity of Bratislava and Kosice, for instance, experiencing above average numbers of firms.
The opposite situation can be observed in the low-income and structurally disadvantaged
regions in East Slovakia where cities and villages are experiencing below average service
provision.
6Similar results are obtained for the other occupations and time periods.
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The Moran’s I statistics7 reported in Table 3 show that there is significant spatial corre-
lation in the number of firms (as well as in the market characteristics). This clearly suggests
that observations for the different cities and villages are not independent and that the spatial
dimension needs to be taken into account explicitly in the econometric model.
3.2 Empirical analysis
The empirical framework closely follows Schaumans and Verboven (2015) and represents a
simplified version of the pioneering work on the effects of entry and exit by Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991). In modeling the market for retail and professional services, we assume that
firms are identical: per-firm profits on a market with N firms are pi(N) = v(N)S − f , where
v(N) are variable per-firm per-consumer profits, S is market size measured by the number
of consumers and f is the fixed cost of production.
Since per-capita variable profits and fixed costs are unobserved, it is not possible to ana-
lyze the effects of the number of competitors (N) on variable profits v(N) directly. However,
from observing a specific number of firms in a market of size S, we can infer that the N
incumbents break even, whereas the N + 1st potential entrant does not:
piN+1 = v(N + 1)S − f < 0 < v(N)S − f = piN
or equivalently:
ln
v(N + 1)
f
+ lnS < 0 < ln
v(N)
f
+ lnS (1)
The log-ratio of variable profits over fixed costs (lnv(N)
f
) is characterized by a vector of
observable market characteristics (X), firm fixed effects (θN), as well as an unobservable
7Moran’s I (Moran (1950)) is an extension of the Pearson correlation statistic. For a given variable x it is
calculated using the following formula:
I =
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 wij(xi − x¯)(xj − x¯)∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)2
where wij is an element of the row-standardized spatial weights matrix W , which will be described in more
detail in the following section.
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error term (ε).
ln
v(N)
f
= Xβ + θN + ε, ε ∼ N(0, σ2I) (2)
The entry condition in Equation (1) then yields the following entry rule:
y = N , if θN ≤ y∗ < θN+1
y∗ = Xβ + lnS + ε
The parameters β can be estimated from an ordered probit model where θN and θN+1 are
the “cut-points” measuring the change in the variable profits to fixed costs ratio (in log form).
Large differences between consecutive cut-points (θN − θN−1) imply that the N th entrant has
a significant influence on the competitive conduct of the incumbent firms, leading to lower
mark-ups.
In estimating an ordered probit model for the number of firms in regional submarkets, the
existing literature assumes zero correlation in the outcomes of neighboring units. The high
population density of Central European countries, coupled with increasing mobility of con-
sumers and trade between regional submarkets, however, cast doubts upon the assumption of
perfectly isolated regional markets. A model which ignores the presence of spatial correlation
in market structure and market characteristics is likely to provide biased estimates for entry
barriers and competitive effects.8
In order to incorporate spatial autocorrelation in the latent profitability measure (y∗),
we estimate a spatial autocorrelated ordered probit model, as outlined in LeSage and Pace
(2009). This model implies that the entry/exit decision of each firm is not only determined by
local market conditions (summarized in Xβ and lnS) but can also be influenced by favorable
8Note that (some of) the existing empirical studies have attempted to address the spatial correlation
between neighboring markets by including additional explanatory variables (such as the distance to the
nearest town, the number of commuters leaving of the town on a daily basis and the population located with-
in 10 miles of the administrative unit). While the inclusion of spatially lagged explanatory variables will
capture neighborhood effects in market characteristics, the spatial correlation between neighboring regions
in market structure (i.e. the correlation in the endogenous variable, the number of competitors) is ignored.
We discuss different types of spill-over effects in more detail in the next section of the paper.
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or unfavorable conditions in neighboring markets (represented by ρWy∗):
y = N if θN < y
∗ < θN+1
y∗ = ρWy∗ +Xβ + lnS + ε, where ε ∼ N(0, 1) (3)
In the above equationW is a row-standardized spatial weights matrix with elements (prior
to standardization) equal to wij = 1/dist
2
ij, where distij is the distance between regions i
and j. 9
The latent profitability measure (y∗) is assumed to follow a truncated multivariate normal
distribution:
y∗ ∼ TMV N(µ,Ω)
µ = (I − ρW )−1(Xβ + lnS)
Ω = [(I − ρW )′(I − ρW )]−1
In this spatial-lag model, the parameter ρ captures the effects of competition (via the
truncation of the sampling distribution) and demand spill-overs (via changes in the mean of
the distribution). Parameters are estimated using a Bayesian MCMC procedure from the
R package spatialprobit described in more detail in Wilhelm and de Matos (2013). The
method relies on data augmentation. With-in the estimation process values are generated
for the unobserved profitability (y∗) based on the observed number of firms (y) via Gibbs
sampling. The remaining parameters are then calculated conditional on the predicted values
of the latent variable10.
9We set wij = 0 if the distance between regions exceeds 30 kilometers. In choosing a cut-off value of
30 kilometers, we follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) who argue that towns are isolated if there are no
competitors with-in a 20 mile radius. Estimation experiments show that our results are not significantly
affected by changes in the cut-off value.
10The prior for β is normal with mean 0 and variance T = IK10
12, where K is the number of regressors.
For the thresholds, we impose that θN should lie between θN−1 and θN+1 in order to ensure ordering but
remain agnostic about the actual relationship using a uniform prior θN ∼ U(θN−1, θN+1). For the spatial
correlation parameter we again choose an uninformative prior, using a beta (1,1) distribution to assign equal
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The estimation of the model outlined in Equation (3) allows us to compute entry barriers
and to investigate whether these have changed in the transition process. In particular, we
are interested in the (changes in the) minimum market-size (population) necessary for the
first firm to break-even (monopoly entry threshold S1):
S1 = exp(θˆ1 − X¯βˆ − ρˆWy∗)
where X¯ represents the mean value of X and θˆ1, βˆ and ρˆ are the parameter estimates from
the model. A significant decline in S1 between two time periods is indicative of a decrease in
entry barriers.
To analyze firm competitive behavior and investigate changes during the transition, we
follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and compute entry thresholds (sN) and entry threshold
ratios (ETRN):
sN =
exp(θˆN − X¯βˆ − ρˆWy∗)
N
(4)
ETRN =
sNm
sN−1
= exp(θNm − θN) N
Nm
(5)
where Nm represents the upper limit of the number of firms in a market.11
While the existence of significant spatial spill-over effects (ρ = 0) causes entry thresholds
values calculated from non-spatial estimation models to be biased, entry threshold ratios will
not be affected as long as the parameter estimates for the “cut-points” (θN and θN+1) from
the ordered probit model are unbiased.
Entry threshold ratios (sNm/sN) are scale-free measures of the effect of entry on market
conduct. If firms are identical and entry does not change competitive behaviour (mark-
probability to all values of ρ with-in the unit interval. More details on the estimation procedure are available
in LeSage and Pace (2009) pp. 279-299.
11The ordered probit model restricts the number of categories. We follow previous studies and set nm = 7
. The loss of information is unlikely to be significant as the incremental change in the perceived competitive
environment is likely to be small on a market with 7 vs. 8 firms and cities and villages with more than 10
competitors are likely to consist of sub-markets.
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ups), then sNm/sN = 1. Significant deviations of entry threshold ratios from one suggest
that pricing strategies change as the number of firms increases. In other words, if a larger
population is necessary for the next entrant to break even, entry has intensified competition
and reduced mark-ups. Changes in entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios are indicative
for changes in entry barriers as well as the intensity of competition during the transition
period.
4 Results
Tables 4 and 5 report parameter estimates from a spatial ordered probit model. The results
show that population, which is our proxy for market size S, positively affects the number
of firms in all industries and periods. The parameter estimate for the log of population
(α) is significantly different from zero across all occupations and time periods. Wages and
unemployment rates as well as the demographic composition of the population in the market
exert a significant impact in most equations. Because these variables summarize both demand
and cost conditions, we do not attempt to draw structural inferences about the signs of their
coefficients.
4.1 Entry barriers
Based on the parameter estimates of the spatial ordered probit model, the entry thresholds
(sN) for the different industries are calculated. The results are summarized in Table 6.
12 The
estimated monopoly entry threshold population suggests that entry barriers for three retail
professions (automobile dealers, electricians and plumbers) were lowered significantly in the
15 years of transition. Figure 4 in the Appendix illustrates the decrease in entry barriers for
both time periods (1995 to 2001 and 2001 to 2010).
The range of the drop in population necessary for one firm to break-even varies across
12As economic theory constrains the parameter of lnS to 1, we normalize the other parameters when
calculating entry thresholds (i.e. SN = exp
θ−X¯β
α ).
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industries. From 1995 to 2001 (from 2001 to 2010) the population necessary for the first firm
to break even decreased by 11 % (39%) for automobile dealers, 58 % (45%) for plumbers and
38% (68%) for electricians. It is important to note that this change was driven not only by
direct policy decisions aimed at the firms but also by an increase in the real income level in
Slovakia.
Note, however, that the transition towards a market economy followed a different path
for restaurants. In this industry entry thresholds didn’t change significantly during our
observation period. The slight decrease in market coverage and the increase in the geographic
concentration of restaurants in towns could be explained by decreased employment in the
country-side and high employment and income growth in towns. Besides, a lot of universal
and traditional village restaurants were closed down in the country-side while restaurants
with more differentiated products were established in towns.
In our paper, we control for employment (unemployment) and income, but at district
level only. In a sense, we use an aggregated proxy for unemployment and income in all towns
and villages within the district. This may partially explain why we do not capture the effects
described above in our estimation.
Furthermore, the share of household expenditures on restaurants decreased from 7 %
in 2001 to 5 % in 2010, which may have mitigated the effect of growing income over this
period and could have contributed to the relatively constant break-even population. On the
other hand, the share of expenditures on maintenance and repair of dwellings (important for
plumbers and electricians) increased from 1.9 % to 3 % in 2010. As such, the increase in the
real income level in Slovakia could have had stronger impact on electricians and plumbers
than on restaurants because they supply repair services to other firms and entrepreneurs and
not only to population (households). While the real income measured by GDP per capita
increased rapidly between 2001 and 2010, it was driven mainly by the growth in gross profits
and to much lower extend by the growth of real wages. Therefore we can guess that the
growth in demand was higher for electricians and plumbers than for restaurants.
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We conclude that institutional changes and policy reforms implemented between 1995
and 2010 for most markets analyzed resulted in a substantial reduction of entry barriers,
facilitating firm entry in markets where no incumbents were previously present. Very little
change in entry costs occurred in the restaurant market.
4.2 Competitive effects
Changes in competitive pressure due to entry are measured by the ordered probit parameters
θN . Based on these values we calculate entry threshold ratios (s7/sN) for all occupations.
Table 7 reports these values for the four industries in our sample; the evolution over time is
illustrated in Figure 2.
The results indicate that there are sizable differences in the mark-ups of firms who hold
a monopoly position and those faced with competition. Our estimates show that the entry
threshold on a market with 7 competitors is significantly higher than the population necessary
for a monopolist to cover his costs. The estimated threshold ratio (s7/s1) ranges between
1.84 and 3.75 and is significantly different from 1 for all periods and professions13.
For most occupations and time periods, the largest effect on competition occurred with
the entry of the second and third firm. While the entry threshold ratios remain significantly
different from 1 for the next 3 entrants, their absolute value is much closer to unity, indi-
cating that mark-ups were close to the competitive benchmark. These results are consistent
with findings from previous empirical studies (Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Schaumans and
Verboven (2015)).
The most substantial change can be observed in the automobile dealer and plumber mar-
ket. While the early phase of transition (from 1995 to 2001) led to a significant intensification
of competition for plumbers, the accession to the European Union (from 2001 to 2010) seems
to have had the strongest impact on competition in the automobile dealer market. No clear
13While the estimated entry threshold ratio is even higher for plumbers in 1995, it is also coupled with
higher standard errors, suggesting that it may overestimate the actual difference in competitive pressure
across market structures.
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Figure 2: Break-even population and ETRs in transition
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trend can be observed in the market for electric services; large standard errors do not allow
making conclusive statements regarding the change in competitive conduct in this market.
Only minor changes are observed in the restaurant industry where ETRs decreased signifi-
cantly between 1995 and 2001 but remained relatively constant in the subsequent period; we
observe the smallest decrease in ETRs in absolute terms in this market.
In the case of restaurants, it is also important to note that entry in this market does not
necessarily lead to more competition for potential customers. As argued in Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) and shown in more detail in Schaumans and Verboven (2015), entry might also
increase product variety and thereby have a positive effect on consumers’ willingness to pay.
This countervailing effect of entry reduces entry threshold ratios (since it decreases effective
competitive pressure). We would expect this “variety effect” of entry to become stronger
with the increase in real income between 1995 and 2010. This may explain why hardly any
change in entry threshold ratios is observed in the restaurant industry.
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4.3 Spatial spill-overs
The parameter ρ measures the influence of the spatially weighted (unobserved) measure of
neighborhood profitability (Wy∗) on the (unobserved) measure of profitability in the local
market (y∗). The theoretical impact of these spill-overs on the number of firms in a local
market is inherently ambiguous. At least three different effects can be relevant.
First, spill-over effects can be attributed to demand linkages14 between neighboring mar-
kets. Firms not only benefit from an increase in local population (local demand) but also
gain from a large population in neighboring markets. Note that 58% of the markets in our
sample had no automobile dealer in 2001, for plumbers this number goes up to 70% and for
electricians it reaches 77%. Inhabitants in these cities and villages will patronize firms in
other (neighboring) cities; these neighboring markets will thus benefit from positive demand
spill-overs.
While demand spill-over effects (to some extent) are taken into account in the existing
empirical literature by including measures of the population in neighboring regions, counter-
vailing spill-over effects due to competitive forces typically are ignored. The above numbers
suggest that not all goods are produced locally but that some are imported from neighboring
markets. Firms in a local market thus are exposed to competitive pressure from firms in
neighboring markets, which counteracts the aforementioned demand spill-over effects (and
implies a negative parameter value for ρ).
Finally, a non-zero value for ρ could be the result of unobserved differences in entry
barriers across regions. Note that the pace of transition has not been the same in all parts
of Slovakia and structural change and economic development are unevenly balanced between
regions. While western regions of Slovakia are in closer proximity to EU markets and have a
much better network of good roads and motorways, the poorer eastern regions border similar
14While theoretically it would be possible to isolate demand linkages by estimating an SDM model, where
the spatially lagged population is one of the explanatory variables, the strong correlation between population
and the number of firms makes it difficult to separate Wy∗ from WlnS. This collinearity results in counter-
intuitive results which point to a negative effect of neighborhood population and a positive effect from the
lagged number of firms. The issue of collinearity is also aggravated by the fact that some control variables
are available at district level leading to a close connection between X and WX.
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poor regions in neighboring countries and suffer from significant transport infrastructure
bottlenecks. Unobservable differences in the economic environment of larger regions would
imply a positive spatial correlation in the error term and thus a positive parameter estimate
for ρ.
Table 4 reports significant and positive parameter estimates for ρ for all periods and
occupations. This suggests that spatial spill-over effects are important and that the effect
of demand linkages and/or the positive correlation in unobservable regional characteristics
seems to outweigh the negative spill-over effects associated with competitive forces between
neighboring regions.
The positive spill-over effects are likely to wane with the decline of entry barriers, mainly
because consumers are given the opportunity to buy locally and as such have a smaller
incentive to make purchases in neighboring towns which should decrease the demand spill-
overs across town borders. This decline is clearly visible in the estimates of the spill-over
parameter for plumbers and automobile dealers.
Surprisingly, the opposite trend can be observed in the market of electricians as well as
the restaurant market, where spill-over effects (parameter estimates of ρ) remain similar in
all periods and even increase over the period 1995 to 2010. This result is intriguing for
electricians, since this occupation experienced the largest inflow of firms. One may view
the increase in the parameter ρ as indicative of the presence of disproportionally large pay-
offs in high-profit neighborhoods. The pay-offs of entering in a neighborhood with high
profitability, even when entry barriers are sufficiently low to increase exposure to competition,
may increase if sellers provide services not only to households but also to corporate clients in
related industries with agglomeration effects. If this is the case, the presence of a competitor
in the neighborhood may be offset by the extra demand generated from the presence of firms
from other industries.15 With entry of new firms in the automobile manufacturing and ICT
15Schaumans and Verboven (2008) study the strategic complementarity of entry into related industries
(pharmacies and physicians) in more detail. In their model, the marginal profits from entering in the phar-
macy market increase when a physician decides to enter in the same regional market. They find empirical
evidence for 847 local markets (defined at the town level) in 2001 in Belgium that entry into one profession
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sector being spatially clustered and closely related to accession into the EU, one can see that
the importance of proximity to profitable neighboring markets rose for electricians in 2010.
While this effect is unlikely to be significant for retail automobile dealers and plumbers, it
could very well be the case that the demand for electricians is higher in areas where large
production capacities are present and hence generate spatial clustering.
The spatial spill-overs also appear to be increasing in the restaurant industry. The number
of sellers in this category did not increase significantly in our observation period, as new
entry was generally offset by exits of existing firms. As noted by Berry and Waldfogel
(2010), this industry has a number of specifics not shared by other occupations. While
positive spatial spill-over effects were relatively small in the first two observation periods, they
increased substantially in 2010. This can be attributed, on the one hand, to improvements
in infrastructure and a reduction in costs of visiting more distant restaurants. On the other
hand, it is important to note that the size of the relevant geographical market might differ
with respect to quality of the restaurant. Berry and Waldfogel (2010) suggest that “(l)imited
service restaurants have a neighborhood as their geographic market while the market area for
fancier restaurants is probably closer to the entire metropolitan area” (p.10). The observed
increase in income levels might have led to a higher willingness to pay for variety and quality
could thus explain why the relevant geographical market has expanded for restaurants.
As a final illustration of the importance of spatial spill-over effects, we estimate by how
much the local break-even population changes when the average population in the neigh-
borhood increases. The results are summarized in Figure 3. We find the expected negative
relationship in all cases (having a large number of consumers close-by means that the sellers
don’t need to rely solely on local population). This effect is non-linear and hence depends
on the point of the population distribution we choose to draw from. Looking at the market
has a positive effect on the profitability of entry into the other profession, suggesting that the entry decisions
by firms of different professions are strategic complements.
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Figure 3: Simulation of the relationship between local break-even population and neighboring
population for electricians in 2010
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Note: While there are towns with a population above 4000 individuals, these have been removed for the
graph in order to improve readability (furthermore, the marginal effect of consumers wanes as population
grows).
for electricians, for example, if the neighboring town has a population equal to the median
of the population distribution, then a single consumer in the local market can be substituted
by 16 consumers in the neighborhood, suggesting that at the median local firms expect to
gain 6% of the profitability of the neighboring markets. This smaller weight of neighborhood
population can be attributed both to transportation costs (which may be carried by the firm
or the consumers). The decrease in the marginal effect of consumers is inherent in the model
and not a result of the estimation results. However, one could argue that the lack of linearity
in this case is desirable, as small-town sellers are not likely to be able to attract all consumers
from large urban markets.
All in all, we find evidence for the presence of spatial interaction in entry decisions.
Furthermore, this process appears to change during the transition process. The direction of
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these changes depends strongly on product characteristics.
5 Summary and Extensions
The present paper provides first (indirect) empirical evidence on the effects of entry on market
conduct for a transition economy. We use the framework pioneered by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991) and estimate size thresholds required to support different numbers of firms for four
retail and professional service industries. Firms’ entry and exit decisions reveal information
about the underlying (latent) profit function, the role of entry costs and the intensity of
competition. The three time periods analyzed (1995, 2001 and 2010) characterize the different
stages of the Slovakian transformation process. In 1995, the Slovak economy was in the early
phases of a turbulent transition process with an unclear trajectory of its future route. Half
a decade later, in 2001, the economy was in the process of relieving itself of post-socialist
deformations and preparing for European integration. After being a member of the European
Union for six years, the relevant institutions as well as the functioning of the Slovak economy
in 2010 have already converged significantly towards Western European standards.
Consistent with these observations, our results indicate that the effect of entry on market
conduct has changed over time. While entry threshold ratios tend to be larger than one and
decline with the number of firms in most professions in 1995, the estimation results obtained
for 2010 suggest entry threshold ratios much closer to one. This finding is indicative of a
significant decline in entry barriers. 16
The second novel contribution of the present paper concerns the explicit analysis of spatial
spill-over effects in the entry-threshold approach. These effects should be particularly im-
portant in densely populated markets (such as those of Central European countries or large
urban areas in general). Parameter estimates from spatial ordered probit models suggest
16In the 1990s, Slovakia was the country with the largest number of days required to start a business among
the 18 countries listed in Table 3 in Estrin (2002). However, the country cut the time to register a business
in half a few years later and, according to the “World Bank Doing Business” survey, was ranked among top
reformers in the business environment in 2005.
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that demand spill-overs and/or the effects associated with a positive correlation in unobserv-
able explanatory variables outweigh negative spill-over effects caused by competitive forces
between neighboring cities and villages. While these spatial effects are found to decline over
the transition period for automobile dealers and plumbers, we observe an increase in the
estimated spill-over parameters for electricians and restaurants.
Unfortunately, identification and isolation of the individual (counterveiling) spatial effects
(demand spill-overs, competitive effects as well as effects associated with spatially correlated
residuals) is not possible in the empirical model used in the present paper but is deferred to
future research. Similarly, future work should provide additional insights into the importance
of sunk costs and entry barriers for entry thresholds and firm conduct by supplementing the
present approach with an analysis of prices and costs (Einav and Levin (2010)). Further, the
impact of infrastructure quality and human capital could be considered explicitly in empirical
models on entry, exit and competition. And finally, following the approach suggested in Pakes
et al. (2007) or Abbring and Campbell (2010) would allow researchers to extend the static
Bresnahan and Reiss framework to a dynamic setting. Explicitly modeling the dynamics of
structural change is particularly important in order to further improve our understanding of
the relationship between entry and competition in a transition economy.
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Table 1: The number of firms in regional submarkets in 1995, 2001, 2010
Number of Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
firms 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Number of local markets
0 1,812 1,664 1,232 2,467 2,190 1,321 2,542 2,013 1,501 1,106 1,218 1,240
1 526 550 621 229 362 578 197 442 577 783 692 668
2 217 240 300 61 130 327 46 162 296 377 371 317
3 83 115 195 25 51 199 19 78 165 188 155 191
4 52 70 133 24 32 107 12 41 104 110 119 118
5 31 48 86 3 15 89 8 23 54 65 47 77
6 18 26 64 4 5 58 0 19 46 43 39 52
≥ 7 104 145 295 30 73 247 19 80 183 171 217 263
Total 2,843 2,858 2,926 2,843 2,858 2,926 2,843 2,858 2,926 2,843 2,858 2,926
Share of local markets with a particular number of firms in %
0 63.74 56.87 43.11 86.77 74.85 46.22 89.41 68.80 52.52 38.90 41.63 43.39
1 18.40 19.35 21.22 8.01 12.73 19.75 6.89 15.55 19.72 27.40 24.34 22.83
2 7.42 8.40 10.55 2.08 4.55 11.50 1.57 5.67 10.41 12.88 12.98 11.15
3 2.92 3.93 6.82 0.88 1.74 6.96 0.67 2.67 5.77 6.61 5.30 6.68
4 1.82 2.46 4.55 0.84 1.13 3.66 0.42 1.44 3.55 3.85 4.19 4.03
5 1.06 1.68 3.02 0.10 0.52 3.13 0.27 0.80 1.90 2.22 1.64 2.71
6 0.63 0.89 2.24 0.14 0.17 2.03 0.00 0.65 1.61 1.51 1.33 1.82
≥ 7 3.64 5.10 10.08 1.05 2.57 8.44 0.67 2.81 6.25 5.98 7.63 8.99
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Table 2: Transition matrices: 1995 to 2010
Number of car dealers in 2010 Number of electricians in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1995
0 0.59 0.24 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
1995
0 0.51 0.21 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04
1 0.23 0.26 0.16 0.12 0.1 0.05 0.03 0.05 1 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.2
2 0.11 0.12 0.24 0.16 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.14 2 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.15 0.38
3 0.01 0.11 0.1 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.34 3 0.04 0.08 0 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.6
4 0 0.1 0 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.54 4 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.12 0.12 0 0.04 0.58
5 0 0 0 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.16 0.68 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
6 0 0 0 0.11 0.06 0 0.06 0.78 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
7 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.02 0.01 0.96 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Number of plumbers in 2010 Number of restaurants in 2010
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1995
0 0.56 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
1995
0 0.66 0.21 0.07 0.03 0.01 0 0 0
1 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16 1 0.43 0.32 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.24 2 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04
3 0.11 0 0.05 0.21 0.05 0 0.21 0.37 3 0.14 0.21 0.19 0.14 0.12 0.06 0.05 0.09
4 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.25 0 0.67 4 0.11 0.14 0.1 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.19
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 0 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.06 0.25
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.42
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 0.01 0 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.84
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Table 3: Spatial autocorrelation in firm numbers and market characteristics
Year 1995 2001 2010
Variable Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value Moran’s I p-value
Firm Numbers
Automobile dealers 0.138 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.267 0.000
Electricians 0.065 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.246 0.000
Plumbers 0.112 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.247 0.000
Restaurants 0.155 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.253 0.000
Market Characteristics
Population 0.004 0.501 0.086 0.000 0.100 0.000
Wage 0.817 0.000 0.703 0.000 0.759 0.000
Unemployment 0.913 0.000 0.915 0.000 0.908 0.000
% Young 0.290 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.230 0.000
% Senior 0.278 0.000 0.279 0.000 0.259 0.000
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Table 4: Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in
1995, 2001 and 2010
Number of Automobile dealers Electricians
firms 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.9323*** 0.9567*** 1.0506*** 0.7722*** 0.8508*** 0.9989***
(0.0335) (0.0367) (0.0486) (0.0434) (0.0359) (0.0473)
Wages -0.0085*** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0041*** -0.001***
(0.0022) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0003)
Unemployment (%) -0.3717 -0.8070** -2.1094*** -1.2989 -3.9555*** -1.6208***
(0.6221) (0.3955) (0.4591) (0.8714) (0.5017) (0.4375)
Young (%) -6.428*** -6.9225*** -5.7315*** -3.6165*** -4.7688*** -4.1251***
(0.9291) (0.8049) (0.6822) (1.3306) (0.9589) (65.5416)
Elderly (%) -4.0319*** -2.9757*** -1.724*** -2.4394** -2.7801*** -0.3243
(0.7435) (0.6889) (0.6472) (1.1268) (0.8620) (0.6289)
θ1 2.1573*** 4.3283*** 4.931*** 4.7595*** 2.4242*** 4.6199***
(0.6859) (0.5030) (0.3979) (0.9696) (0.5782) (0.4032)
θ2 3.0339*** 5.1834*** 5.8089*** 5.584*** 3.2617*** 5.4291***
(0.6859) (0.5103) (0.4241) (0.9715) (0.5797) (0.4285)
θ3 3.6428*** 5.7321*** 6.3211*** 6.0594*** 3.8226*** 5.9864***
(0.6884) (0.5166) (0.4487) (0.975) (0.5830) (0.4498)
θ4 4.0072*** 6.1162*** 6.7329*** 6.3642*** 4.1770*** 6.4341***
(0.6912) (0.5214) (0.471) (0.9775) (0.5878) (0.4725)
θ5 4.3249*** 6.4394*** 7.0842*** 6.8108*** 4.5004*** 6.7399***
(0.6941) (0.5270) (0.4906) (0.9861) (0.5905) (0.493)
θ6 4.5849*** 6.7398*** 7.3644*** 6.9095*** 4.7104*** 7.0524***
(0.6961) (0.5320) (0.5053) (0.9879) (0.5934) (0.5114)
θ7 4.7803*** 6.9535*** 7.6173*** 7.0423*** 4.8001*** 7.3061***
(0.6986) (0.5335) (0.5112) (0.9895) (0.5952) (0.5176)
ρ 0.2954*** 0.1952*** 0.202*** 0.2687*** 0.2181*** 0.2967***
(0.0361) (0.0350) (0.0325) (0.0655) (0.0446) (0.0315)
Observations 2,843 2,858 2,926 2,843 2,858 2,926
Note: All markets with more than seven firms are pooled in one category. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***,**, and * indicates that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 5: Parameter estimates obtained from a spatial ordered probit model for Slovakia in
1995, 2001 and 2010
Number of Plumbers Restaurants
firms 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Population (log) (α) 0.4858*** 0.7692*** 0.8689*** 1.1259*** 1.0510*** 1.008***
(0.0373) (0.0323) (0.0394) (0.0351) (0.0363) (0.0473)
Wages 0.0008 -0.0033*** -0.001*** -0.0056*** -0.0011 -0.0008***
(0.0027) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Unemployment (%) -1.5532* -2.7388*** -2.2081*** -1.0819* -1.927*** -1.2649***
(0.8104) (0.4326) (0.453) (0.5779) (0.3889) (0.4241)
Young (%) -0.0027 -2.9360*** -4.1713*** -5.5108*** -6.2010*** -3.8981***
(1.2387) (0.8290) (0.6838) (0.7803) (0.7028) (0.647)
Elderly (%) -1.4517 -2.4633*** -2.0243*** -1.8826*** -2.1562*** 0.5796
(1.0866) (0.7722) (0.6655) (0.5927) (0.5844) (0.5948)
θ1 3.4594*** 2.5256*** 3.5195*** 3.8612*** 3.9933*** 5.0548***
(0.904) (0.5246) (0.3925) (0.615) (0.4542) (0.404)
θ2 4.2427*** 3.3712*** 4.3417*** 4.9053*** 4.9364*** 5.9422***
(0.9069) (0.5286) (0.4062) (0.6169) (0.4593) (0.4289)
θ3 4.6454*** 3.9031*** 4.9092*** 5.5774*** 5.6290*** 6.4954***
(0.9087) (0.5321) (0.424) (0.6218) (0.4665) (0.4524)
θ4 4.926*** 4.2992*** 5.3342*** 6.0696*** 6.0420*** 6.9349***
(0.9119) (0.5348) (0.4391) (0.6259) (0.4734) (0.4795)
θ5 5.1875*** 4.5977*** 5.6878*** 6.4669*** 6.4616*** 7.2793***
(0.9182) (0.5382) (0.4538) (0.6294) (0.4810) (0.504)
θ6 5.445*** 4.8176*** 5.9174*** 6.7827*** 6.6769*** 7.5532***
(0.9231) (0.5399) (0.4638) (0.6308) (0.4851) (0.5191)
θ7 5.0386*** 6.1581*** 7.0602*** 6.8908*** 7.7802***
(0.5414) (0.4684) (0.6329) (0.4872) (0.5246)
ρ 0.5725*** 0.3835*** 0.3364*** 0.0877*** 0.1109*** 0.2742***
(0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0323) (0.033) (0.0327) (0.032)
Observations 2,843 2,858 2,926 2,843 2,858 2,926
Note: All markets with more than five firms are pooled in one category. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
***,**, and * indicates that parameters are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table 6: Per-firm entry thresholds for Slovakia in 1995, 2001, and 2010
Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Total threshold population
S1 924 818 502 2,808 1,751 558 2,894 1,219 670 434 483 508
S2 2,366 2,000 1,157 8,170 4,686 1,254 14,517 3,661 1,727 1,098 1,185 1,225
S3 4,547 3,550 1,884 15,121 9,059 2,191 33,258 7,310 3,318 1,995 2,291 2,120
S4 6,722 5,303 2,788 22,439 13,741 3,429 59,266 12,235 5,411 3,088 3,393 3,279
S5 9,451 7,434 3,895 40,009 20,096 4,658 101,530 18,036 8,128 4,395 5,059 4,614
S6 12,491 10,177 5,085 45,469 25,724 6,369 172,485 24,010 10,586 5,818 6,208 6,055
S7 15,403 12,723 6,469 53,999 28,582 8,210 31,995 13,966 7,444 7,610 7,585
Threshold population per firm
s1 924 818 502 2,808 1,751 558 2,894 1,219 670 434 483 508
(29) (29) (22) (338) (105) (21) (535) (57) (24) (12) (15) (18)
s2 1,183 1,000 579 4,085 2,343 627 7,259 1,831 863 549 593 612
(31) (22) (10) (337) (103) (11) (1,053) (71) (19) (9) (10) (12)
s3 1,516 1,183 628 5,040 3,020 730 11,086 2,437 1,106 665 764 707
(36) (24) (11) (325) (112) (12) (1,291) (83) (23) (10) (12) (11)
s4 1,680 1,326 697 5,610 3,435 857 1,4816 3,059 1,353 772 848 820
(35) (25) (12) (301) (108) (15) (1,442) (93) (27) (10) (12) (14)
s5 1,890 1,487 779 8,002 4,019 932 20,306 3,607 1,626 879 1,012 923
(36) (26) (13) (401) (113) (16) (1,730) (99) (32) (11) (15) (16)
s6 2,082 1,696 848 7,578 4,288 1,061 28,747 4,002 1,764 970 1,035 1,009
(36) (27) (14) (327) (107) (18) (2,260) (98) (32) (11) (14) (17)
s7 2,200 1,818 924 7,714 4,083 1,173 4,571 1,995 1,063 1,087 1,084
(34) (26) (13) (296) (90) (17) (102) (32) (11) (13) (16)
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Entry threshold ratios for Slovakia in 1995, 2001, and 2010)
Automobile dealers Electricians Plumbers Restaurants
1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010 1995 2001 2010
Per-firm entry threshold ratios (s7/sN )
s7/s1 2.38 2.22 1.84 2.75 2.33 2.10 9.93 3.75 2.98 2.45 2.25 2.13
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.35) (0.15) (0.09) (1.99) (0.19) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
s7/s2 1.86 1.82 1.60 1.89 1.74 1.87 3.96 2.49 2.31 1.94 1.83 1.77
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.17) (0.09) (0.04) (0.65) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
s7/s3 1.45 1.54 1.47 1.53 1.35 1.61 2.59 1.88 1.80 1.60 1.42 1.53
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.36) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
s7/s4 1.31 1.37 1.33 1.38 1.19 1.37 1.94 1.49 1.47 1.38 1.28 1.32
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.03) (0.24) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
s7/s5 1.16 1.22 1.19 0.96 1.02 1.26 1.42 1.27 1.23 1.21 1.07 1.17
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
s7/s6 1.06 1.07 1.09 1.02 0.95 1.10 1.14 1.13 1.10 1.05 1.07
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Test ratio = 1
s7/s1 = 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 276.08 210.33 101.90 25.37 80.54 168.32 20.06 201.03 276.33 377.04 286.24 194.03
s7/s2 = 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 235.04 290.15 267.59 26.70 75.55 400.40 20.52 181.39 422.72 579.55 491.69 331.80
s7/s3 = 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 122.20 191.32 206.07 21.29 36.60 281.34 19.11 131.55 282.11 422.62 234.91 258.10
s7/s4 = 1 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 83.19 131.05 118.67 17.12 17.14 141.39 15.00 76.38 154.97 258.47 137.78 119.16
s7/s5 = 1 *** *** *** *** ** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 32.91 65.15 49.71 0.35 0.19 82.39 6.42 35.41 53.49 107.28 13.03 41.46
s7/s6 = 1 ** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Chi-sq. 5.38 9.49 14.64 0.09 2.25 17.73 14.10 22.78 30.77 7.49 9.49
Note: As s7 could not be estimated for plumbers in 1995, the ETRs are calculated based on s6. ***,**, and
* indicates that the ETRs are significantly different from one at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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6 Appendix
Not to be published - Available from the authors upon request
Estimation procedure:
The following section, which relies heavily on LeSage (xxx), briefly outlines the estimation
procedure used for the SAR ordered probit model.
1. Calculation of the expected distribution of profitability based on observed market char-
acteristics, p(y∗|β, ρ,W,X, S). For each observation the estimated mean latent prof-
itability of the market is calculated based on the parameter estimates:
E(y∗) = µ = (In − ρW )−1(Xβ + lnS)
as well as the covariance in the profitabilities due to spatial correlation:
H = V ar(y∗)−1 = (In − ρW )T (In − ρW )
2. Update of the distribution based on the observed number of firms,
∫ θN+1
θN
p(y∗|y = N, θ) =
1. Based on the observed number of firms, y, we can impose restrictions about the
actual realization of y∗, which will lie between φN and φN+1 if there are N firms on the
market. Our draw of y∗ is thus from the following truncated multivariate distribution:
y∗ ∼ TMV N(µ,H−1)
y∗min = φN , y
∗
max = φN+1
Draws for the unobserved profitability are obtained via Gibbs sampling from the con-
ditional distribution of the profits in each town, based on the estimated profitability
of all of its neighbors and the proposed parameter values: p(y∗i |y∗−i, β, ρ, φ), where a
truncated univariate normal distribution is used.
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3. Update of the parameters determining the effects of market characteristics based on the
calculated spatially weighted average of profitability. Based on the sample of y∗, we can
adjust our expectations about the true value of the parameters in β:
c∗ = E[β] = (XTX + T−1)−1[XT (In − ρW )y∗ + T−1c]
In the above equation (XTX + T−1)−1XT (In − ρW )y∗ represents information coming
from the data, while (XTX +T−1)−1T−1c = (TXTX + I)−1c is generated by the prior.
Given our agnostic approach, for most variables the results should be driven by the
former expression. Based on the sample of y∗, we also adjust our expectations about
the variance of the parameters in β:
T ∗ = V ar[β] = (XTX + T−1)−1
The more informative the data, the more concentrated the function we draw from
becomes:
p(β|ρ, y∗) ∝MVN(c∗, T ∗)
4. Calculating the conditional distribution of ρ, p(ρ|β, y∗). The conditional distribution of
ρ is equal to:
p(ρ|β, y∗) ∝ |In − ρW |exp(−1
2
[(In − ρW )y∗ −Xβ − lnS]T [(In − ρW )y∗ −Xβ − lnS])
This distribution does not take on a known form and needs to be estimated. This is
done via numerical integration over the range of possible values for rho. A draw is
then taken from the resulting distribution F , via a draw from a uniform distribution:
η ∼ U(0, 1)
ρ = F−1(η)
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5. Recalculation of the entry threshold effects based on the observed spatially correlated
data. The threshold level of profitability, which allows N firms to break even is sampled
from a uniform distribution with the following range:
φMINN = max(max(y
∗ : y = N − 1), φN − 1)
The minimum threshold for N firms cannot be smaller than the threshold for N − 1
firms, hence it must be larger than the largest profitability estimated for a market with
only N − 1 firms.
φMAXN = min(min(y
∗ : y = N), φN + 1)
The threshold should also be positioned so as to ensure that if N firms have entered,
they have a profitability of at least θN .
6. Once the parameters have been updated, the loop is repeated. After sufficient burn-in
rounds, the average effect is calculated by averaging over the draws from the MCMC
sampler.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics (N1995 = 2843, N2001 = 2858, N2010 = 2926)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of automobile dealers in 1995 1.87 16.52 0 741
Number of automobile dealers in 2001 2.34 11.07 0 213
Number of automobile dealers in 2010 4.23 17.99 0 349
Number of electricians in 1995 0.19 0.70 0 12
Number of electricians in 2001 0.90 5.31 0 170
Number of electricians in 2010 3.08 11.34 0 248
Number of plumbers in 1995 0.15 0.60 0 11
Number of plumbers in 2001 0.98 4.01 0 99
Number of plumbers in 2010 2.13 6.94 0 132
Number of restaurants in 1995 3.53 29.46 0 1409
Number of restaurants in 2001 4.00 21.06 0 509
Number of restaurants in 2010 4.83 25.71 0 618
Number of pharmacies in 1995 0.30 1.97 0 77
Number of pharmacies in 2001 0.26 1.35 0 35
Number of pharmacies in 2010 0.51 3.14 0 81
Number of doctors in 1995 0.96 6.46 0 245
Number of doctors in 2001 1.89 9.52 0 159
Number of doctors in 2010 2.69 14.54 0 216
Number of dentists in 1995 0.59 4.41 0 169
Number of dentists in 2001 0.75 3.96 0 65
Number of dentists in 2010 0.87 4.81 0 85
Population in 1993 1878.77 10964.59 13 452253
Population in 2001 1790.00 6051.69 7 117000
Population in 2010 1858.00 5973.80 12 111800
Average nominal wage 1995 215.27 13.51 193 302
Average nominal wage 2001 363.10 42.08 294 657
Average nominal wage 2010 680.70 97.10 492 1327
Average unemployment rate in 1995 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.26
Average unemployment rate in 2001 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.35
Average unemployment rate in 2010 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.34
Share of population aged below 14 in 1993 0.21 0.05 0 0.51
Share of population aged below 14 in 2001 0.19 0.05 0 0.53
Share of population aged below 14 in 2010 0.16 0.05 0 0.69
Share of population aged above 60 in 1993 0.24 0.08 0.01 0.92
Share of population aged above 60 in 2001 0.23 0.07 0.02 0.89
Share of population aged above 60 in 2010 0.23 0.06 0.03 0.67
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Figure 4: Changes in the break-even population (baseline: 2001)
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